Publications

Pomirchy, M. (accepted). A Theory of Intra-Party Factions in the U.S. Congress. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy. (link)

Abstract: Intra-party factions have increasingly wielded influence on key agenda items in the U.S. Congress. To better understand the welfare implications of these groups, this paper presents a formal model in which incumbents choose to join a faction and cast a vote on the majority party’s agenda, after which an election takes place. This theory shows that while factions may enable incumbents to vote against the party’s agenda, factions can have positive effects on party welfare by signaling incumbents’ ideological type to their districts, thereby improving incumbents’ reelection prospects and increasing the number of seats held by the party. I present case studies on the House Freedom Caucus’s opposition to a funding measure for the DHS and the Blue Dog Democrats’ defections on cap-and-trade to illustrate the theory.

Pomirchy, M. (2023). Electoral Proximity and Issue-Specific Responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 87(3), 662–688. (link) (pdf)

Abstract: Do elections increase responsiveness of legislators to their constituents? Previous studies that examine the effect of electoral proximity have been unable to control for the roll-call agenda and differences in unobserved covariates between legislators. This paper utilizes a natural experiment in four state legislatures - Arkansas, Illinois, Florida, and Texas - where term length was randomly assigned. In this design, I compare the responsiveness to constituency opinion of those that were randomly assigned to a two-year term to those assigned a four-year term on different issue areas, like the economy, environment, and crime. There is no evidence for an electoral proximity effect on responsiveness. Moreover, in the Illinois State Senate, I examine the effect of electoral proximity on legislative responsiveness on several roll-call votes, including the legalization of medical marijuana and gay marriage.

Lee, B., Pomirchy, M., & Schonfeld, B. (2023). Does the U.S. Congress Respond to Public Opinion on Trade? American Politics Research, 51(6), 731-748. (link) (pdf)

Abstract: Are U.S. legislators responsive to public opinion on trade? Despite the prevalence of preference-based approaches to international trade, not much work has directly assessed the relationship between constituency opinion and positioning by members of Congress on trade bills. We assess dynamic responsiveness (whether shifting constituency opinion on trade yields corresponding changes among legislators) by exploiting an original dataset on the positions of members of Congress on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at various points leading up to the November 1993 roll-call vote. We find no evidence of dynamic responsiveness to shifting constituency opinion on even a highly salient piece of trade legislation. We provide qualitative evidence that interest group influence may instead be the predominant source of shifting legislator positioning on trade.

Bussing, A., & Pomirchy, M. (2022). Congressional Oversight and Electoral Accountability. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 34(1), 35–58. (link) (pdf)

Abstract: Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. Given this, why do we witness periods of low oversight even under divided government? We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. We find that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. We present three case studies, the House Democrats in the 116th Congress, the Elian Gonzalez custody case, and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

Working Papers

Legislator Contact and Ideological Bias: Evidence From Witness Slips in the Illinois General Assembly (with Michael Kistner) (pdf)

Abstract: Prior work suggests that representational gaps may arise due to biases in who contacts politicians. However, direct measures of legislator contact by members of the public are elusive. This paper leverages a unique data source: witness slips in the Illinois General Assembly, online forms individuals can use to support or oppose legislation before a committee hearing. Using these expressed positions, we place witnesses on the same ideological scale as legislators. We find that witnesses are located closer to the median Republican state legislator (both in Illinois and the nation as a whole) than the median Democrat; furthermore, conservative witnesses are disproportionately active in filing slips. Additional analyses demonstrate that legislators are more likely to vote for (against) a bill or amendment when witnesses support (oppose) the measure, particularly when slips come from donors or constituents.

Elections and Ideological Representation

Partisan Cues, Ideological Constraint, and Personal Issue Importance